Tracing the MGM Breach from Initial Access to Ransomware
Imagine being seconds away from winning a thousand dollars at one of the biggest casinos in Las Vegas when, suddenly, everything goes silent. The gaming systems stop working, and a piercing silence fills the space. The excitement shifts to confusion and unease, as guests begin to voice their complaints. This was the situation at MGM Resort in September 2023.
It was announced that a cyberattack had affected the hotels and casinos, leading to downtime for gaming systems, hotel reservations, Wi-Fi, and room key cards. Investigations by cybersecurity researchers indicated that the attack was linked to cybercriminal groups associated with Scattered Spider and ALPHV/BlackCat.
The attack was carried out using social engineering techniques; employees’ backgrounds were researched using social media platforms such as LinkedIn, and they were then impersonated through vishing (voice phishing) to gather login credentials from the hotel’s IT help desk. Credentials to users’ Okta accounts were reportedly compromised, and access to internal systems — including customer data — was unknowingly granted. Furthermore, through lateral movement, the attackers gained elevated privileges and were able to disrupt hotel and casino systems, with widespread outages becoming the first visible sign of the breach.
Thereafter, customer data such as PII, including names, contact information, driver’s license numbers, and in some cases Social Security numbers, was accessed and exfiltrated. ALPHV later claimed to have stolen approximately 6TB of data and attempted to extort MGM. Facing pressure from customers and internal stakeholders, MGM chose not to pay the ransom, a decision that contributed to prolonged system outages and significant financial losses. Millions of customer records were affected, and several lawsuits were filed against the company. This resulted in substantial financial and reputational damage that proved difficult to recover from.
It was later alleged in lawsuits that customer records were not adequately protected and that gaps existed in MGM’s security practices. While Okta had issued general warnings across the industry regarding social-engineering attacks, the incident highlighted shortcomings in identity security and access controls at MGM. In response, MGM took steps to support affected customers and strengthen its security posture by implementing network segmentation, stronger encryption practices, enhanced intrusion detection and prevention systems, and improved authorization processes.
It is essential to be aware of evolving scamming techniques and to develop strategies to respond to breaches as efficiently as possible. Ignoring security practices can only lead to further harm.